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$EVWUDFW
This paper is the first part of a two parts essay aimed at giving a contractarian foundation to the 
concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) meant as an extended model of corporate 
governance of the firm. I fist present the heuristics of the scientific program meant to theorizing 
over an institution like a system of corporate governance, which is partitioned in two domains, 
the justification domain and the compliance domain. Bargaining theory, reputation game and 
reciprocity theories, as distinct pieces of game theory, are the main theoretical tools employed in 
developing the answer to the relevant questions in the two domains respectively.  The first part 
focuses over justification according to the contractarian point of view. At start, a definition of 
CSR as an extended model of corporate governance, based on the fiduciary duties owed to all 
the firm’s stakeholders, is given. Then, by setting the basic context of incompleteness of 
contracts and abuse of authority, I analyze how the extended view of corporate governance 
directly arises form within the criticism of contemporary neo-institutional economic theory of 
the firm. Hence, from an application of the theory of bargaining games, the structure of a multi-
stakeholder firm based on the constitutional contract theory is deduced, which satisfies the basic 
requirements of a justification in the contractarian approach. This is a sequential model of 
constitutional choice, where at the first step a constitution is chosen and then a post-
constitutional coalition game is played. Both the games are solved in terms of the proper 
cooperative bargaining and coalition game solution concept, and results are interpreted not only 
according to the perspective of the theory of rational bargaining, but also as an impartial 
solution, starting form a fair status quo and corresponding to reasonable intuitions on 
distributive justice.  On these basis the query for a prescriptive theory of governance and 
strategic management – able to overcome the criticism raised against the lack of determination 
and unicity of a multi-stakeholder model of corporate governance and strategy - is answered, so 
that I am able to define an objective function for the firm consistent with the idea of CSR as a 
model of governance. At last, the paper tells the contractarian story, which can be taken as a 
potential explanation of the firm, of how the multi-fiduciary corporation may emerge from the 
first and the second social contract, as a firm endowed with the typical structure of control, but 
constrained by CSR obligations that those who in the firm hold a position of authority owe to all 
the non controlling stakeholders. 

Key Words: Corporate Social Responsibly, Fiduciary duties, Stakeholder theory, 
Theory of the firm, Incompleteness of contracts, Social contract, Bargaining games, 
Nash bargaining solution, Distributive Justice, Impartiality. 
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
 ,QWURGXFWLRQDQGPRWLYDWLRQVSDUWV,DQG,,
This essay aims at giving a contractarian foundation to the concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR hereafter) meant as an extended model of corporate governance of 
the firm. In order to account for an institutional model of corporate governance the idea 
of rational agreement (i.e. the social contract) must work simultaneously in two 
directions: on one hand it must work as a justification by giving moral reasons to accept 
the institution from an impartial and impersonal standpoint; on the other hand, the same 
idea must show direct implication to personal incentives and motivations to implement 
in practice the institution. In fact  within a “state of nature” situation, namely a situation 
of pre-institutional strategic interaction, the institution can be implemented only if the 
agreement is self-enforceable. In other words, the social contract can resort to no other 
source of implementation than those the agreement is able to induce by itself. David 
Gauthier made clear this point by distinguishing two separate rationality tests that the 
theory of “morals by agreement” needs satisfy simultaneously (see. Gauthier, 1986, 
pp.116-118) 1 :  
a) ,QWHUQDOUDWLRQDOLW\: it is a rationality appraisal that all individuals would accomplish 
when faced with the decision of entering any agreement over rules enabling to 
escape a reciprocally unprofitable “natural interaction” and to start a mode of 
mutually beneficial cooperative interaction. It asks for an H[ DQWH condition of 
rationality concerning how to reach the agreement over one point out of the set of 
possible bargaining outcomes. “Internal” is typically the rationality of accepting a 
deal in a bargaining game over a set of possible outcomes each coinciding with a 
distribution of a cooperative surplus and construable as behaving according to the 
prescription of a given institution. Thus, it is “internal” because it understands 
rationality from within the perspective of bargaining - which takes for granted that if 
an agreement is reached, then it will be carried out for the mutual advantage of the 
bargainers. Internal rationality (or H[DQWH rationality) indeed has one single problem 
to solve. Rational bargaining takes place in situations where there is some feasible 
surplus to be distributed amongst the individual participants granted that they are 
able to reach an agreement. But there are too many agreement possible - some 
preferred by one party others preferred by another. Hence, to devise a solution 
acceptable to all implies solving a mixed motives game of coordination. A 
bargaining game is a way to solve this coordination problem before playing the 
cooperative game in which the agreed joint strategy will be carried out in order to 
produce and allocate the surplus. Thus, the ex ante problem of selecting by 
bargaining a unique solution can be detached form the ex post problem of 
implementing the contract itself. As far as we are in the internal rationality 
perspective, we have only to deal with the problem of H[DQWH acceptability of an 
agreement. To be sure, this does not exclude that the agreement itself can be seen as 
involving apparently different questions, couched in the languages of “mutual 
personal advantage” and “distributive justice and fairness”. Which bargain would be 
accepted by each player from her self-interested standpoint? What agreement would 
                                                
1
 Even though Gauthier’s technical solution to the problem of external rationality, constrained 
maximisation,  has not gained large acceptance, nor I will pursue it here, his heuristics for the programme 
of a rational-choice-based theory of the social contract remains according to me unrivalled.  
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be acceptable form an impartial and impersonal standpoint? Would the agreement 
players will accept be also “ fair”  according to our best intuition of just distribution 
of the cooperation outcome? All these related questions have to be answered in the 
ex ante perspective. 
b) ([WHUQDO UDWLRQDOLW\: when we move form H[ DQWH to H[ SRVW perspective, we ask 
whether any agreement may have been agreed can also be complied with by the 
same players who agreed on it. This is a different problem because the game-logic 
of compliance is different from that of entering a bargain in a cooperative game. It is 
instead the logic of an H[ SRVW  non cooperative game, in which players decide 
separately but interdependently whether or not to comply with the H[ DQWH agreed 
contract. Under this perspective the question is not so much whether the contract 
provides reasonably high joint benefits and distributes them in an acceptable fair 
way, but mainly whether there are incentives to cheat on the counterparty in the 
agreement given the expectation that he abides by the contract. Thus the search for 
external rationality must confront, according to Gauthier, with the problem of 
potential divorce between individual rationality (expected personal utility 
maximisation) and social optimality (i.e. Pareto efficiency), which is instantiated by 
the typical Prisoner’s dilemma game.  
Ken Binmore made also a similar point in his series of contributions to “ game theory 
and the social contract”  (1989, 1991, 1994 and 1997) 2. These authors – notwithstanding 
their strong differences - put the program of giving a satisfactory contractarian 
foundation to institutions in both the terms of cooperative bargaining theory on one 
hand, and non-cooperative game theory on the other hand, and here, and also elsewhere 
(see Sacconi 1991 and 2000), I follow this mode of theorizing. However there are more 
aspects than the mere game theoretical ones to be discussed in this account of CSR as 
corporate governance model.  Just to outline the set of problems I will be dealing with 
                                                
2
 In criticizing both Harsanyi and Rawls for their use of individual decision theory in modelling social 
justice – Binmore (1989) argues that an  H[DQWH social contract under the “ veil of ignorance” , i.e. reached 
from an impersonal and impartial standpoint, should be better modelled as a (at least two players) 
bargaining over the intersection of the outcomes spaces of two typical cooperative Nash bargaining 
problems, generated by the symmetric permutation of the axes representing the players’ utility assessment 
with respect to a given outcomes space. This is the case just because this symmetric space of outcomes 
can also be interpreted in a completely different way form the H[ SRVW perspective concerning the 
underlying “ game of life” . Actually, the H[SRVW rationality of the social contract  - when players are back 
from the hypothetical position to the real game of life – is checked through a non-cooperative-game 
analysis of the underlying situation aimed to verify whether the social contract (struck under a “ veil of 
ignorance” ) coincides with a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. Binmore models the 
underlying “ game of life”  as an evolutionary repeated game whose combinations of evolutionary stable 
strategies coincides with the set of Nash equilibria identifiable in the static game representing the 
situation in which the social contract has to be put in practice (see Binmore 1997). Moreover the 
intersection of outcomes spaces resulting form the symmetric permutation of players’ places in the 
cooperative bargaining game defined under veil of ignorance coincides with the set of equilibrium points 
derivable form the repeated game of life.  Thus, were the social contract agreed over one of these points, 
it would also be stable ex post in so far as it coincides with a Nash equilibrium. Then the bargaining 
model devised for the ex ante agreement can be appreciated not just as a way to reach an impartial 
outcome within the symmetric bargaining game, but also as a way to select an equilibrium amongst the 
many possible in the underlying game of life. The clue to this theory is its simultaneous accounting for 
two separated rationality requirements to the social contract, quite akin to the LQWHUQDO and H[WHUQDO 
rationality tests outlined in the main text.  
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along this essay, let me partition them into two large categories that echoes the 
distinction made just before.  
$) First, I define the FRQWH[WRIMXVWLILFDWLRQ for a business ethics norm as the domain in 
which the condition of validity of a norm (to say, a business ethics code of conduct or a 
CSR-code of corporate governance) coincides with its impartial rational acceptability. 
Thanks to impartial acceptability it gains its normative force, i.e. prescribes action or 
behaviour to the agents. The  contractarian approach rests on the hypothesis that a 
rational agreement model is the best way to account for justification, and the one I will 
pursue here will also understand the idea of a rational agreement in terms of an outcome 
of a bargaining game appropriately defined. In this context the questions that will 
concern us are four:  
(A1)  Can we develop a bargaining model whereby an institutional framework for CSR 
as corporate governance is deducible as the solution for the players’  rational calculation 
of their best bargaining strategy? This question concerns the H[ DQWH or “ internal”  
rationality of a model of governance seen as an outcome of a social contract amongst 
stakeholders: it asks whether the CSR model of governance could be acceptable for 
each and whichever stakeholder once he takes the role of a rational bargainers in a 
hypothetical situation defined as the “ social contract”  position. The idea is that if each 
player will recognise that it is individually rational to him and also to whichever 
participant to agree upon such a possible outcome of the bargaining game, then we have 
provided a justification at least in the sense of rational mutual advantage; 
 (A2) Rational mutual advantage as the basis for accepting a deal from each and 
whichever individual player’ s standpoint in a bargaining game, however, is not all that 
matters in the context of justification. Acceptability may also require a second kind of 
test concerning the moral features (not only the bargaining-game ones) of the deal the 
parties would have struck through hypothetical bargaining, and these concern both the 
notion of impartiality and that of fairness. To check for the first, it must be verified that 
the bargaining rational solution is invariant under the permutation amongst the point of 
views of all the participants in the hypothetical bargaining situation. But also freedom 
from any moral arbitrariness, like the influence of force, fraud and manipulation has to 
be checked. Moreover the bargain must also be free from lock-in effects, which are the 
inherent source of unfairness in re-contracting situations usually taken as the starting 
point for the contractarian explanation of why the firm as “ transaction governance 
structure”  emerges.  Moreover we can still check for the fairness of a social contract, 
even though agreed in a morally depurated bargaining situation, in terms of its 
correspondence to our best moral intuitions of what should be a fair or equitable 
distribution of cooperative benefits amongst the firm’ s stakeholders. Quite obviously 
singling out acceptable principles of distributive justice for the balancing amongst the 
stakeholders’  claims will result in a basic feature of the contractarian theory of the firm. 
In fact, the equitable balance would transmit justice to the corresponding structure of 
fiduciary duties owed by the firm to all its stakeholders and to the CSR governance 
structure as a whole. 
(A3) But if distributive justice principles are singled out through rational bargaining 
over governance structures of the firm, this can also provide for somehow precise 
definitions of the fiduciary duties that makes the same idea of CSR and multi-
stakeholder firm less undefined and vague. This can answer the third question to be 
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asked, which concerns the actual prescriptivism of a stakeholder’ s normative theory. In 
order to be actually prescriptive it cannot be confined only to some very loose ethical 
standards that most institutional arrangements of the firm may satisfy, leaving the 
governance structure and the management strategy underdetermined. It should also 
prescribe a management strategy or a stringent set of constraints whereby a strategy can 
be singled out.  
Indeed, one of the most serious drawbacks in the existing social contract theories in 
business ethics is that they are not able to derive definite prescriptions for the 
institutional structure of the firm and for the business ethics norms that would be 
accepted YLD a social contract by the stakeholders of the firm. The indefiniteness of local 
social contracts over the specific business ethics norms regulating specific business 
community, groups, firms or organisations in Donaldson and Dunfee’ s ISCT (1994, 
1995, 1999) is paramount to this weakness.3 They see this indefiniteness as a force of 
their approach because of their interpretation of the  notion of morally-free zone. But as 
a matter of fact we cannot derive form that theory any contractarian explanation of how 
local business norms, for example concerning the self-regulation of a large business 
corporation, would be shaped by a social contract amongst the firm’ s stakeholders. 
Starting from the assumption of “ bounded moral rationality”  to allow such 
indefiniteness in local social contracts (which is replicated also at the global social 
contract level, as in ISCT we cannot find any contractarian deduction of hyper-norms 
which should constraint the freedom of agreeing on whatever specific norm at local 
level) misses the point. In fact, general abstract principles of ethics, seen as the result of 
both the hypothetical social contracts at the global and at the local level (i.e. at the firm 
level),  should be seen as an alternative approach to rationality with respect to the utility 
maximising model of rationality. The latter is based on the implicit assumption that the 
decision maker is able to represent mentally all the logically possible states of affairs 
and every possible decision consequence and calculating the utility maximum over 
these possibly infinite spaces of states and consequences. The former instead is based 
on abstract and general principles of ethics which are a remedy to the inevitable 
cognitive limitation of the consequentialist model of economic rationality.  They in fact 
admit - by typically fallible but nevertheless reasonable default reasoning - the 
formation of expectations over conducts that take place in the presence of  unforeseen 
states of the world – those states that we cannot predict because of our bounded 
cognitive capabilities. Due to incompleteness of contracts and bounded rationality, 
economic institutions allocate through property rights and hierarchical organizations 
decision rights to certain parties in any sub-set of the economy. The need for general 
and abstract ethics principle (both at global and local levels) rises from the risk this 
discretion may be abused. Thus bounded rationality cannot  be a reason to put aside the 
search for an H[ DQWH procedure able to single out general and abstract principles of 
ethics (the social contract), for this would leave us without any defence against the risk 
that allocated discretion is abused.4 At least this drawback must be recognised as what 
allows the critics - for example Michael Jensen (2001) - to condemn the stakeholder 
                                                
3
 Paramount to this indeterminacy is also the Kantian theory (and hence in some sense contractarian) of 
the firm put forward by Norman Bowie (1999) in so far as it attempts no more than defining some generic  
standards but remains unwilling  to single out the governance structure of the firm according to the 
Kantian view. 
4
 This was in fact the main motivation of my previous book on the social contract of the firm (Sacconi 
2000) 
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approach for its inability to provide a clear benchmark against which management 
strategies and company performances can be assessed, being this indeterminacy also the 
basis for the charge of opening the route to opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
managers. 
(A4) All the foregoing problems concern the need of a well devised normative model. 
They could be better answered in the event that the contractarian approach were able to 
tell a story about the emergence of the firm, whereby the stakeholders agree on a 
determinate constitution of the firm, defining legitimate claims of those in a position to 
run the firm but also of those in a position of being subjected to the authority of the 
former. This story would be a potential explanation of how the stakeholders could have 
built up the firm by striking a balance and collectively deciding the priority order in 
which different interests have to be met and pursued as the goal of the company. Thus, 
the last question to be asked is whether the contractarian account can also give a 
“ potential explanation”  of the emergence of the firm. Of course it should be told in a 
language that makes it comparable to other explanations about why and how the firm 
emerges as an economic institution (typically explanations told in the field of economic 
theory of the firm) 
Let me step now to the second large category of problems. 
%) By the FRQWH[W RI FRPSOLDQFH DQG LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ is meant the domain where the 
validity of a business ethics norm is to be appraised in terms of its effectiveness, i.e. its 
capability to induce endogenous motivations or incentives causing behaviour 
conforming to the norm, so that the norm results implemented in the agents behaviour.  
Justifications by themselves do not answer questions about the implementation of a 
CSR normative model of corporate governance, for the agent’ s standpoint in the 
justification context is neutral, i.e. detached from the particular personal perspective of 
each concrete agent (let be the individual or an artificial actor like the firm or a board of 
directors). In the implementation context instead reasons for action are agent-relative 
(Nagel 1986). They meet intentions, motivational drives and preferences which the 
agent holds simply because he is WKDW particular agent in WKDW particular decision 
position. This simple condition of realism suggests that effectiveness of a norm must be 
seen as the requirement that by implementing the norms the agent will also pursue his 
preference in a rational manner (in the sense of coherence amongst preferences and 
between preferences and actions), admitting both the view that complying can be a tool 
for fulfilling preferences (instrumental view) and that the norm itself may influence 
preference formation (intrinsic view). 
Taking a contractarian standpoint in the justificatory domain, of course, simplifies a lot 
also the accomplishment of the implementation task.  Impartiality within a contractarian 
framework in fact amounts to no more than a condition of invariant individual rational 
acceptance of a given bargaining outcome (under the permutation of personal 
standpoints allowing the impartial decision-maker to take in turn each players’  point of 
view). Thus impartiality is no more than invariance in a class of agent-relative reasons 
for action.  
Nevertheless relevant part of the task remains to be accomplished. Implementation is 
the typical sphere where non-cooperative games are relevant and ex post rationality is 
required, whereas invariance of the individual decisions to accept a norm dictating a 
joint strategy to all the players concerns ex ante rationality only. In the implementation 
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stage instead separate but interdependent strategies are under consideration, and the 
players are always enabled to say either they want to implement the conjoint strategy or 
not. It follows that the main problem to be solved in the implementation context is how 
a CSR norm undertaken voluntarily can also generate motivational causal forces strong 
enough to induce the execution of the norm in situations where it may require the agent 
a counter-interested behaviour at least in the immediate. Clearly this would be the case 
for corporate directors, managers or proprietors were a CSR model of governance to 
require – as it will likely require - to share the firm’ s rent or surplus with other 
stakeholders.  
In the lasting debate over the relationship between rationality and morality some has 
tried a reform of instrumental rationality to include within it also rational choice over 
dispositions to choose5. A disposition would constrain later choices so that the agent 
will be able to disregard local incentives even if these imply that there are local 
advantages in deviating form the action plan corresponding to the disposition. Given 
that the disposition allows abiding by a plan disregarding local incentives to deviate 
from the plan itself, it can be shown that having the disposition corresponding to a plan 
of conditional cooperation is beneficial.  It actually allows the decision maker to gain 
higher overall utility when she meets (and recognizes) another decision maker 
symmetrically disposed, whereas her utility equates that of a non disposed agent when 
such a non disposed agent is met (and recognized). This being true for all, any rational 
actor should decide by instrumental rationality calculation to undertake the disposition 
letting him abide by a plan of conditional cooperation, which allows also locally 
counter-interested actions.  
I will not follow these lines of reasoning, however.  These reforms of instrumental 
rationality seem in fact to presuppose what they should demonstrate. Whereas these 
approaches are expected to reduce morality to rationality by showing that abiding by a 
moral norm is rational, on the contrary they must presume that moral dispositions are 
out there endowed with all their disciplining force independent of rational choice. And 
whereas dispositions must be understood as choices at our disposal - something we can 
decide either developing  or not - they are also presumed to command our later 
behaviours, being immune form opportunistic changes when they seem fit, as if these 
choices were out of our control. 
The most natural answer concerning compatibility between compliance to a norm (for 
example a norm of CSR in the management of the firm) and  the rational pursuing of 
personal preferences therefore remains reputation Reputation– seen as a mean for 
personal advantage – is an incentive in so far as it is instrumental to trust relationships 
among the firm and its stakeholders, which are conductive to better and low-cost 
transactions fulfilling preferences. Conformity to a norm, which SHUVH is not conductive 
to personal interest, turns out to be in the agent’ s best interest because it affects 
reputation and this affords mutually beneficial transactions. Answering the question 
about effectiveness of a norm thus implies a careful consideration of the conditions 
under which the reputation mechanism can properly work. Thus I partition the problems 
to be faced within the implementation domain into two subclasses concerning how 
reputation effects can be effective in the field of business ethics. 
                                                
5
 It is the case of Gauthier’ s FRQVWUDLQHGPD[LPLVDWLRQ theory 1986, 1990,1996) and McClennen’ s 
UHVROXWHFKRLFH theory (1990, 1993). 
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B1) 7KHFRJQLWLYHSUREOHP. Economic agents are endowed with bounded rationality and 
hence the supposition that reputation may depend on commitments defined 
conditionally over any possible state of the world is unrealistic. Reputation can become 
obstructed  if the firm does not know how to make itself recognisable or against what 
benchmark to allow appraisal of his honest behaviour when unforeseen contingencies 
emerge such that traditional commitments are mute over them. Here is the place where 
the cognitive role of explicit even though voluntary business ethics norms, like as a 
code of ethics or a CSR management standard, enters the picture. From the 
implementation standpoint, answering the question about  the cognitive role of explicit 
business ethics norms within the reputation mechanism replies also to the lack of  
prescriptivism and unicity criticism (see again Jensen 2001): it would be no more true 
that a bounded rational manager can resort but to “ shareholders’  value maximisation”  
because of the simplicity of the rule. Following a CSR governance and management 
standard may be much more consistent whit Simon’ s view of procedural rationality.  
B2) 7KH PRWLYDWLRQ SUREOHP. Once the cognitive problem is solved, reputation will 
activate incentives to comply with a voluntary norm prescribing  the CSR model of 
corporate governance. Till now no exception is needed to the standard model of selfish 
economic man. However reputations can be of many kinds. A company endowed with 
relevant market power and inducing idiosyncratic relationships with its stakeholders, 
could develop the reputation of abusing the trust of its employees, costumers, suppliers, 
capital lenders just as much as it is needed to leave them nearly indifferent between 
staying and staying out the relation with the firm itself. Then a company by giving just a 
bit to the stakeholders, can attempt to acquire their acquiescence to its substantive  
incompliance. This is not the case in practice, however. Stakeholders, or at least those 
who practice stakeholders’  activism, declines acquiescence and actively counteracts 
corporate hypocritical conduct. How does the social contract approach account for these  
apparently irrational and unselfish actions? Recent behavioural theories of the economic 
agent’ s motivational complexity suggest interesting explanations, as they variously 
concentrates on intrinsic value, social preferences and iniquity aversion, reciprocity and 
intentional kindness. 6 In this essay, however, I will resort to a related but original view 
of GHRQWRORJLFDOPRWLYDWLRQVas it is strictly connected to the idea that motivations are 
driven by coherence with a principle or ideal. It is indeed a contractarian view of 
conformist preferences and reciprocity in that non selfish utilities derive from the desire 
to conform to an ideal of fairness, granted that the ideal can be drawn from a 
hypothetical contract and the other participants in the social contract are also expected 
to reciprocate conformity to the same ideal of fairness.    
This essay is split in two parts. Sec. 2 of part I gives my basic definition of CSR as an 
extended model of corporate governance. Sec. 3 discusses how an extended view of 
corporate governance arises form within the criticism of contemporary neo-institutional 
economic theory of the firm, and sets out the basic context of incompleteness of 
contracts and abuse of authority that any attempt to justify and implement the model 
                                                
6
 Among the studies suggesting to go  beyond the mere selfish representation of human preferences  the 
following can be remembered  Bernheim  (1994), Rabin (1993), Chareness and Rabin (2002) , Sugden 
(1998), Frey (1997) , Falck amd Fishbaker (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (2001), Falk, Fehr and Fishbaker 
(2003). However I will refer in this essay to my own contributions to the field (see Sacconi 2004,  
Grimalda and Sacconi 2002, 2004,  Sacconi and Grimalda 2004). For these references see the 
bibliography at the end of part II. 
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must fit in. Sec. 4 develops in detail the deduction of the structure of a multi-stakeholder 
firm based on the constitutional contract theory, which satisfies the basic requirements 
put forward in points A1 and A2 of this introduction. This quite long section is the 
normative core of the essay and is couched with the minimum necessary  use of the 
tools of bargaining games. I apologize if the use of these tools is nevertheless 
cumbersome to the non technical reader, but using less game theory would have made 
the formulation of any consistent and precise notion of rational bargain impossible. 
Hence in sec. 5 the query for a prescriptive theory of governance and strategic 
management – question A3- is answered so that I am able to define an objective 
function for the firm consistent with the idea of CSR as a model of governance. Sec. 6 
finally tells the contractarian story asked for in point A4, which can be taken as a 
potential explanation of the firm emergence.  
Part II (see the related paper “ A social contract account for CSR as extended model of 
corporate governance (Part II): compliance, reputation and reciprocity”  LQIUD) starkly 
changes the picture, as I exit there the domain of justification to enter the 
implementation and compliance domain. In section 1 of part II I discuss at long the 
game theoretical problem of compliance and implementation of an ex ante agreed 
contract.  In sec. 2 I introduce the model of reputation games with reference to the basic 
game of trust, which is the second technical piece of game theory that is needed to make 
sense of all this discussion about implementation, compliance and self-regulation. This 
is necessary to understand in particular why self-regulation meant as the mere resort to a 
long-run strategy in a repeated game of trust fails in making sure the reputation of the 
firm when the game is surrounded by incomplete contracts and unforeseen 
contingencies. This is so for the cognitive fragilities of the reputation mechanism and 
the impact of unforeseen contingencies over them. Sec. 3 elaborates upon the idea of 
proper self-regulation based on explicit norms, and develops the logic and the structure 
that these self-regulatory norms must satisfy if they have to serve as a gap-filling tool 
for the remedy of cognitive limitations in the reputation mechanism. This section, in 
answering the question raised in point B1, echoes my previous book on  the social 
contract of the firm (Sacconi 2000), where the logical foundations for the reputation 
mechanism based on an ethical decision procedure employing fuzzy logic and default 
reasoning are worked out. Here I give only the intuitions. At last, sec. 4 of part II  
develops an entirely new application of the theory of conformist preferences to the 
problem of the motivational role that is played by business ethics norms in activating 
stakeholders’  activism. This section answers the “ real life”  question raised in point B2 
of this introduction. The price to be paid is the more formalised language of this section. 
In fact it was impossible to take conformist preferences as known and moreover the 
very result derives straightforwardly from the calculation of stakeholders’  overall 
utilities when the hypotheses of conformism and reciprocity are introduced.  
 
 $GHILQLWLRQRI&65DVDPRGHORIH[WHQGHGFRUSRUDWHJRYHUQDQFH
Let me start by suggesting  a definition of CSR: &RUSRUDWH6RFLDO5HVSRQVLELOLW\ LVD
PRGHO RI H[WHQGHG FRUSRUDWH JRYHUQDQFH ZKHUHE\ WKDW UXQV D ILUP HQWUHSUHQHXUV
GLUHFWRUV DQG PDQDJHUV KDYH UHVSRQVLELOLWLHV WKDW UDQJH IURP IXOILOPHQW RI WKHLU
ILGXFLDU\GXWLHVWRZDUGVWKHRZQHUVWRIXOILOPHQWRIDQDORJRXVILGXFLDU\GXWLHVWRZDUGV
DOOWKHILUP¶VVWDNHKROGHUV 
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This definition is consistent with propositions that can be found in official documents 
delivered by international organisations7. For example the EU states:  
“ By stating their social responsibility and voluntarily taking on commitments which go beyond 
common regulatory and conventional requirements, which they would have to respect in any 
case, companies endeavour to raise the standards of social development, environmental 
protection and respect of fundamental rights and embrace an RSHQ JRYHUQDQFH, reconciling 
interests of various stakeholders in an overall approach of quality and sustainability”  
(Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, European Commission,  
Green Paper, p.4, Brussels, 18.7.2001, emphasis added). 
This quotation shows that the UE Commission regards CSR as a form of corporate 
strategic management and as a system for the governance of transactions and relations 
between the firm and its stakeholders. It is clear that here ‘governance’  is no longer the 
set of rules simply allocating property rights and defining the owners’  control over the 
management of a firm. Instead it resembles the neo-institutional view whereby the firm, 
like the contract and other institutional forms, is a ‘governance system’  which 
establishes diverse rights and obligations in order to reduce ‘transaction costs’  and the 
negative externalities of transactions. Moreover the definition is consistent with some of 
the promises delivered by the first attempts to develop a normative stakeholder theory. 
For example, Freeman and Evan recognise the fiduciary relationships amongst the firm 
and all its stakeholders and the ensuing nature of the firm as a tool for coordinating 
efforts aimed to the satisfaction of all the stakeholders’  interests. Therefore they ask for 
(but unfortunately do not develop in detail) a definition of corporate governance and 
strategy based on Kantian principles like the one that, being every stakeholder not only 
a mean for the firm but also an end in herself, her rights and interests should be pursued 
by the firm and she should also participate in the decision processes affecting her 
interests (see Even and Freeman 1989, p.82). Similarly, Donaldson and Preston, in 
concluding their famous essay on the priority of the normative side of stakeholder 
theory, stated that a managerial stakeholder approach should derive from a complex 
view of property rights, including not only claims to control and residual earning, but 
also the owner’ s constraints and responsibilities toward stakeholders (see Donaldson 
and Preston 1995, pp.83-85). 
To make precise my definition however let me define its basic terms:    
D)LGXFLDU\GXWLHV It is assumed that a subject has a legitimate interest but is unable to 
make the relevant decisions, in the sense that s/he does not know what goals to pursue, 
what alternative to choose, or how to deploy his/her resources in order to satisfy his/her 
interest. S/he, the WUXVWRU, therefore delegates decisions to a WUXVWHH empowered to 
choose actions and goals. The trustee may thus use the trustor’ s resources and select the 
appropriate course of action. For a fiduciary relationship – this being the basis of the 
trustee’ s authority YLVjYLV the trustor – to arise, the latter must possess a claim (right) 
towards the former. In other words, the trustee directs actions and uses the resources 
made over to him/her so that results are obtained which satisfy (to the best extent 
possible) the trustor’ s interests. These claims (i.e. the trustor’ s ULJKWV) impose fiduciary 
duties on the agent who is entitled with authority (the trustee), which s/he is obliged to 
fulfil. The fiduciary relation applies in a wide variety of instances: tutor/minor and 
                                                
7
 see also OECD,  3ULQFLSOHVRI&RUSRUDWH*RYHUQDQFH,  chapter 3, April, 1999. 
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teacher/pupil relationships, and (in the corporate domain) the relation between the board 
of a trust and its beneficiaries, or according to the predominant opinion, between the 
board of directors of a joint-stock company and its shareholders and then more 
generally between management and owners (if the latter do not run the enterprise 
themselves). By the term ‘fiduciary duty’ , therefore, is meant the duty (or 
responsibility) to exercise authority for the good of those who have granted that 
authority and are therefore subject to it.8
 E 6WDNHKROGHUV. This term denotes individuals or groups with a major stake in the 
running of the firm and who are able to influence it significantly (Freeman and McVea 
2002). However, a distinction should be drawn between the following two categories: 
(i) 6WDNHKROGHUV LQ WKH VWULFW VHQVH: those who have an interest at stake because they 
have made specific investments in the firm (in the form of human capital, financial 
capital, social capital or trust, physical or environmental capital, or for the 
development of dedicated technologies, etc.) – that is, investments which may 
significantly increase the total value generated by the firm (net of the costs sustained 
for that purpose) and which are made specifically in relation to WKDW firm (and not in 
any other) so that their value is idiosyncratically related to the completion of the 
transactions carried out by or in relation to that firm. These stakeholders are 
reciprocallydependent on the firm because they influence its value but at the same 
time – given the specificity of their investment – depend largely upon it for 
satisfaction of their well-being prospects (lock-in effect). 
(ii) 6WDNHKROGHUV LQ WKH EURDG VHQVH: those individuals or groups whose interest is 
involved because they XQGHUJR the ‘external effects’ , positive or negative, of the 
transactions performed by the firm, even if they do not directly participate in the 
transaction, so that they do not contribute to, nor directly receive value from the firm. 
       It is evident that these two categories cannot be sharply separated. For example, a 
manufacturer in a developing country who supplies a component for an industrial good 
assembled in a Western country is essentially dependent on his contract; and with his 
low labour costs (due to the customer’ s market power) he makes a crucial contribution 
to the Western firm’ s profits. At the same time, however, if a mature technology is used, 
he is easily replaceable by the Western firm, whose dependence on the supplier is 
therefore limited (in short, the reciprocal dependence relation is not symmetric).  
We are now able to appreciate the scope of CSR defined as an extended form of 
governance: it extends the concept of fiduciary duty from a mono-stakeholder setting 
(where the sole stakeholder relevant to identification of fiduciary duties is the owner of 
the firm) to a multi-stakeholder one in which the firm owes fiduciary duties to DOO its 
stakeholders (the owners included). It is obvious that classification of stakeholders on 
the basis of the nature of their relationship with the firm must be regarded as important 
in gauging these further fiduciary duties.9 
                                                
8
 On fiduciary duties see Flannigan (1989). 
9
 At first sight, it might be objected that many stakeholders, in both the ‘strict’  and ‘broad’  senses, do not 
have relations with a firm such that they formally delegate authority to those who run it (for example, 
they do not vote), with the consequence that the fiduciary duties as defined earlier do not apply to them. 
However, in the model of the social contract as a hypothetical explanation of the origin of the firm – see 
section 6 – all the stakeholders participate in the “ firm’ s second social contract” , with the consequence 
that their trust constitutes the authority of the firm’ s owner and manager. This also explains how the 
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 (FRQRPLFWKHRU\DQGWKHLGHDRIH[WHQGHGILGXFLDU\GXWLHV
 7KHRU\RIWKHILUP
Let me now inquire whether economic theory provides support for the thesis that the 
firm has ‘extended’  responsibilities towards its stakeholders. According to neo-
institutional theory (Williamson 1975, 1986; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 
1990; Hart 1995; Hansmann 1996), the firm emerges as an institutional  form of 
‘unified transactions governance’  intended to remedy imperfections in the contracts that 
regulate exchange relations among subjects endowed with diverse assets (capital, 
labour, instrumental goods, consumption decisions, and so on). These assets, if used 
jointly, are able to generate a surplus over the cost of their use that is higher than in the 
case of their separate use by each asset-holder. However, contracts by which these 
asset-holders regulate their exchanges are incomplete: they do not include provisos 
covering unforeseen events, owing to the costs of drafting them, or because the 
cognitive limits of the human mind make it impossible to predict all possible states of 
the world. Yet for these assets to be used in the best manner possible, specific 
investments must be made: investments undertaken with a view to the value that they 
may produce within an idiosyncratic contractual relation. This entails that the surplus 
generated with respect to the costs sustained by each party to the exchange is 
determined by the undertaking of VSHFLILF activities with VSHFLILF counterparts 
(suppliers, customers, employees, financiers, etc.). Let us assume that parties behave 
opportunistically (that is, they are egoists who act with astuteness). Thus, once the 
investments have been made, contractual incompleteness means that the terms of the 
contract can be renegotiated, so that the party in a stronger H[SRVW position is able to 
appropriate the entire surplus, thereby expropriating the other stakeholders. But if 
agents expect to be expropriated, they will have no incentive to undertake their 
investments at the optimal level. This expectation of unfair treatment gives rise to a loss 
of efficiency at the social level. 
 The firm responds to this problem by bringing the various transactions under control of 
a hierarchical authority – the authority, that is, of the party which owns the firm and 
through ownership is entitled to make decisions over the contingencies that were not ex 
ante contractible. Unified governance supplements incomplete contracts with authority 
relations through the vertical and horizontal integration of the units that previously 
made separate contributions. The firm is therefore a special contractual form: when 
contracts lack provisos contingent upon unforeseen events, they can be ‘completed’  
with the ‘residual right of control’  which entitles its holder to decide what should be 
done about decisions not H[ DQWH contractible– that is, decisions ‘left over’  from the 
original contract and that become available only when unforeseen situations occur.  
The residual right of control underpins authority: those parties entitled with residual 
right of control may threaten the other parties to the contract with exclusion from the 
physical assets of the firm, thereby ensuring that H[DQWH non-contracted decisions are 
taken H[SRVW to their own advantage. They are thus safeguarded against opportunism by 
the other stakeholders, and they are able to protect the expected value of their 
                                                                                                                                          
authority of the latter may be accepted by these subjects. Moreover, the hypothetical social contract is 
typically used to explain how authority – that is, legitimate power – may come about at both the political 
and organizational levels: see Green (1990) and  Raz (1985). For a discussion of managerial authority see 
McMahon (1989) and Sacconi (1991).     
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investments in situations where contract incompleteness provides margins of discretion 
when residual decisions have to be taken. There is therefore an efficiency rationale for 
the idea of the firm as ‘unified governance’  of transactions: if one party (a class of 
stakeholders) has made a specific investment of greater importance than those made by 
the others at risk, or if its exercise of ‘unified governance’  discourages opportunism by 
the others to appropriate the surplus, then that party should be granted the property right 
and with it the right to take ‘residual’  decisions. This is also the basis for regulation of 
authority delegation from the owners to directors or managers by corporate governance 
rules, when the owners themselves are not able of directly exercising the entire residual 
right of control.  Fiduciary duties owed to the owners must guarantee that delegated 
exercise of residual rights of  control by the board of directors or managers will 
maintain or improve the efficiency of their original allocation to the selected class of 
stakeholders. 
 7KHULVNRIDEXVHRIDXWKRULW\
However, one should not underestimate the risks of the firm TXD unified governance. 
There is not just one single stakeholder at risk because of contract incompleteness; it is 
usually the case that multiple stakeholders undertake specific investments (investments 
in human capital, investments of trust byconsumers, investments of financial capital, 
investments by suppliers in raw materials, technologies and instrumental goods). 
Contracts with these stakeholders are also incomplete.  
Yet if a firm brings its contracts with certain stakeholders (labour contracts, obligations 
towards and relations with minority shareholders) under the authority of a party to 
whom is allocated control over residual decisions (for example, the controlling 
shareholder group) – and more generally if a party is enabled by its GHIDFWRpower to 
exercise discretion over H[ DQWH non-contractible decisions concerning implicit or 
explicit contractual relations with the other stakeholders (consumers, customers, 
suppliers, creditors, etc.) – what, one may ask, is there to ensure protection of 
investments and interests other than those of the controlling stakeholder? It is evident 
that if fiduciary duties attach RQO\ to ownership, those stakeholders ZLWKRXW residual 
right of control will QRW be protected by the fiduciary duties of those who run the firm. 
The inherent risk, therefore, is an abuse of authority (Sacconi 1997, 2000). Those 
wielding authority may use it to expropriate the specific investments of others by 
exploiting ‘gaps’  in contracts – which persist even under unified governance (in fact it 
simply allocates to only one stakeholder the right to ‘fill’  those gaps with its 
discretionary decisions). Those in a position of authority, in fact, are able to threaten the 
other stakeholders with exclusion from access to physical assets of the firm, or from the 
benefits of the contract, to the point that those other stakeholders become indifferent 
between accepting the expropriation and forgoing the value of their investments by 
withdrawing from the relation. Thus the entire surplus, included that part of it imputable 
to efforts and investments made by the non controlling stakeholders, will be 
appropriated by the controlling party. Again forward-looking stakeholders will be 
deterred form entering the hierarchical transaction with the controlling party. In general, 
this will produce an internal FULVLVRIOHJLWLPDF\ between firm and stakeholders (a crisis 
in the relationships between the organizational authorities and participants in the 
organization) and an external FULVLVRIWUXVW (in relationships with stakeholders that have 
entered into contractual or external relations with the organization). Various 
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stakeholders will H[DQWH have a reduced incentive to invest (if they foresee the risk of 
abuse), while H[ SRVW they will resort to conflicting or disloyal behaviour (typically 
possible when asymmetry of information is inherent in the execution of some 
subordinate activity) in the belief that they are being subjected to abuse of authority. In 
the economist’ s jargon, this is a ‘second best’  state of affairs (less than optimum): all 
governance solutions based on the allocation of property rights to a single party may 
approximate social efficiency, but they can QHYHU fully achieve it. This much is 
acknowledged by the theoreticians of contractual incompleteness when they point out 
that the allocation of the residual right of control induces the party protected by that 
right to over-invest, while those not so protected are induced to under-invest, with a 
consequent shortfall with regard to the social optimum (Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart 
1995).  
On the other hand, if the stakeholder category entitled to exercise ownership (the double 
right of controlling residual decisions and claiming residual revenue; see Hansmann 
1987, 1996) is selected on the basis of its ability to minimize total costs deriving form 
the summation of contractual costs borne by of various stakeholders and costs of 
exercising authority, it is by no means certain that a solution will be found which 
reduces HDFK of those costs to the minimum (that is, reduces opportunism suffered by 
each stakeholder to the minimum). Sufficient for this solution to emerge is, for example, 
that the governance costs of one class (the capital-holders, for example) are low enough 
to counterbalance a relative increase in the contractual costs borne by another class (the 
workers, for example) compared to alternative cases (for instance the case in which 
there is no centralized governance, or the one in which it is a sub-set of workers that 
governs, or the consumers). In this case, too, some incentives are nullified, which 
distances the real-world solution from complete (Pareto) social efficiency. The fact is 
that the relative (in)efficiency depends on manifest or simply expected unfairness: 
separation between efficiency and fairness (a myth of neoclassical economics) is no 
longer feasible when we face the real-life problem of working out acceptable solution 
for the governance of transactions.  
My suggestion is therefore that when CSR is viewed as ‘extended governance’ , it 
completes the firm as an institution of transactions governance (Sacconi 2000). The 
firm’ s legitimacy deficit (whatever category of stakeholders is placed in control of it) is 
remedied if the residual control right is accompanied by further fiduciary duties towards 
the subjects at risk of abuse of authority and deprived of the residual control right. At 
the same time, this is a move towards greater social efficiency because it reduces the 
disincentives and social costs generated by the abuse of authority. From this 
perspective, ‘extended governance’  should comprise: 
• WKH UHVLGXDO FRQWURO ULJKW (ownership) allocated to the stakeholder with the 
largest investments at risk and with relatively low governance costs, as well as the 
right to delegate authority to professional directors and management; 
• WKH ILGXFLDU\ GXWLHV of those who effectively run the firm (administrators and 
managers) towards the owners, given that these have delegated control to them; 
• WKHILGXFLDU\GXWLHVRIWKRVHLQDSRVLWLRQRIDXWKRULW\LQWKHILUPWKHRZQHURU
WKHPDQDJHUV WRZDUGV WKH QRQFRQWUROOLQJ VWDNHKROGHUV: the obligation, that is, to 
run the firm in a manner such that these stakeholders are not deprived of their fair 
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shares of the surplus produced from their specific investments, and that they are not 
subject to negative externalities. 10 
  $WKHRU\RIWKHK\SRWKHWLFDOFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQWUDFWRIWKHILUP
This section outlines the theory of the constitutional contract of the firm (see also 
Sacconi 2000) as the basis not only for the allocation of control over the firm -  that is 
the right to take discretionary decisions and appropriate the surplus -  but also to include 
in this structure RWKHU rights – essentially responsibility claims in defence of 
stakeholders RWKHU those protected by the property right. The resulting institutional 
structure defines the principles of the firm’ s governance structure consistently with the 
notion of CSR as a governance model with multiple fiduciary duties. 
The model of constitutional contract of the firm rests on an analogy between the social 
contract theories used to justify “ by agreement”  both the ‘legal constitution’  (Buchanan 
1979) and the mutually advantageous rules of morals (Gauthier 1986) of a large society 
on one side,  and the economic theory of efficient choice of the control structure of 
firms, based on the idea of contractual incompleteness on the other side (Williamson 
1975, Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and Moore 1990). An essentially similar feature of 
these theories in particular is the sequential structure of both models, whereby a 
‘constitution of rights’  is initially established and then, in the next phase, the parties 
bargain within the institutional structure selected in the light of the occurrence of events 
which the constitution is unable to regulate in every detail. These events explain why 
contractual decisions are taken in the second period that have not been taken in the first, 
but which are nevertheless influenced by the choice set made available to the parties by 
the rights granted to them by the institutional structure selected in the initial phase. The 
theory of the firm expresses this situation with the concept of the ‘incomplete 
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 I have proposed in previous works (see Sacconi 1991) a social contract view of the firm’ s 
ownership and managerial ethics based on a similar re-examination of the theory of firm, as well as the 
notion of extended fiduciary duties (see also Sacconi 1999, 2000).  The cooperative-game-theory of the 
firm put forward by Mashairo Aoki (Aoki 1984) can be taken as the path breaking work in this theorizing 
over the firm.  By intervening in a discussion about the stakeholder approach to company law (see also 
Chapman 1993, Machey  e Miller 1993, Daniels 1993, Romano 1993), Oliver Hart himself recognized 
that the risk that  non controlling stakeholders may be subjected to contracting costs by those who own 
the firm would justify some corporate statutes to extend fiduciary duties also to the stakeholders at risk 
(Hart 1993).Thereafter a convergence to a similar model comes from the merger of the incomplete 
contract model and the Alchian and Demestz’ s team production theory of the firm. Hence the firm can be 
seen as a ‘nexus’  of specific investments regulated by incomplete contracts and a governance structure, 
rather than as a nexus of complete contracts, (Zingales 1998,  Rajan and Zingales 2000). Based on a 
similar view, which combines different theories of the firm, is the model of multi-stakeholder governance 
developed by Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout, which sees the purpose of corporate governance structures 
as being prevention of opportunistic behaviour among the members of the team that make specific 
investments. When applied to a public company, this model translates into a board of directors acting as a 
mediating hierarchy: an authority system charged with the task of finding out the appropriate balance in 
the protection of diverse interests (see Blair and Stout 1999). The (controversial) legal basis for this form 
of  “ impartial governance”  exercised by the board of directors and by management in the US joint-stock 
company is the ‘business judgment doctrine’ : the manager’ s use of a standard of professional conduct 
which insulates his/her choices against claims by shareholders (see Blair, Stout 1999, but also see Meese 
2002). Similarly moving from a view of the firm as stakeholders’  productive team (Kaufman 2002), the 
board of directors has been seen as a governance structure representing the point of view of all those 
stakeholders who a) contribute to creating value; b) undertake non diversifiable risks; c) hold strategic 
information  (Kaufman, Englander andWood 2003). 
 
 16 
contracting’  due to unforeseen events not contractible in detail H[ DQWH in the initial 
contract. The idea of contract incompleteness is also implicit in constitutional 
contractarianism, which envisages that the constitutional agreement pre-selects a 
restriction on the possible alternatives, allocating the rights and authority used in post-
constitutional agreements just because it is not foreseeable in the fundamental contract 
every action conditional on every state of the world. The theory of the firm associates 
authority with the allocation of property rights and I follow it under this respect. But I 
also stress that authority (and therefore ownership) are legitimate only to the extent that 
they are accepted in the constitutional contract by all the involved parties (the 
stakeholders). Hence the theory of the constitutional contract of the firm is essentially 
an application of the ethical theory of social contract to the problem of choosing the 
structure of rights and obligations that presides over governance of the firm. This 
includes selecting the party to whom is to be allocated control over the firm, but also (as 
we shall see) goes beyond ownership and control, to include rights to compensation (or 
redress) which give distinctive content to the idea of CSR. 
 5DWLRQDOEDUJDLQLQJRYHUWKHILUPFRQVWLWXWLRQV 
Assume that an economy consists of N individuals and that S of them (the stakeholders 
in the firm) are engaged in a joint productive activity (in various roles: employees, 
investors and capital lenders, consumers, suppliers of row materials, instrumental goods 
and technologies, and communities hosting an activity in a given geographical area). 
These S individuals constitute a coalition (for simplicity’ s sake also called S) whose 
characteristic function is super-additive: that is, by acting cooperatively they are able to 
produce a surplus which would not be forthcoming if they acted separately. Of these 
individuals, M make specific investments, or they are ‘indispensable’  for specific 
investments to yield a surplus. The other members of S instead undertake unspecific 
actions or supply unspecific assets which add value to the coalition S, but they are not 
strictly ORFNHGLQ to the coalition in order to realize the value of their investment. 
Coalition S, as here defined, is coextensive to the concept of WHDP as understood in the 
theory of the firm. Accordingly, ownership of the firm, as the team of S member, and 
authority over it, should be allocated among the M members of S. The other members of 
S are stakeholders tied to S by relations of varying degrees of intensity. The remaining 
N-S individuals are indifferent to the activity in question (they are not stakeholders in 
the sense given to the term by the theory). 
The model depicts a two steps collective decision-making situation among potential 
members of the coalition S.11 The main collective decisions are taken at the beginning  
and the third period, while in the intermediate periods individual decisions and 
information gathering occur. At time t = 0 the allocation of rights is decided (rights not 
only of ownership and control but also of redress and compensation) which determines 
the structure of control over the productive coalition S through a constitutional 
agreement. At time t = 1 the right-holding individuals undertake investment decisions 
with view to subsequent transactions and joint activities in the coalition. At time t = 2 
events occur which are not covered by a clause in the initial contract. At time t = 3 a 
new bargaining game begins, defined for each allocation of rights and for every set of 
investment decisions. That is, the members of the coalition S negotiate a joint plan of 
                                                
11
 Here I elaborate on an model given by Horace Brock (1978,1979) that also suggests the idea of two 
bargaining games in sequence, each endowed with its proper solution concept.  
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action and a distribution of the surplus which reflects  investments and events in t = 2. 
This problem of sequential collective decision-making is modelled as a compounded 
bargaining game Gc on the constitutional and post-constitutional decision, whose first 
phase is the bargaining game carried out at time t = 0, when chosen for each player is a 
set of strategies by means of which a subsequent game can be played at time t = 3. Note 
that this set of strategies is a subset of the strategies available in the initial game. 
 In the background to the constitutional choice game there is a ‘state of nature game’  to 
which the players will be back if they fail to agree cooperatively on a constitution. The 
underlying ‘state of nature game’  admits a single solution mutually disadvantageous for 
all parties, namely a sub-optimal equilibrium. In the theory-of-firm-model the ‘state of 
nature’  corresponds to the situation occurring at time t = 3 where contracts were to be 
renegotiated without any protection, so that the parties would undergo the reciprocal 
opportunistic behaviour made possible by the incompleteness of the initial contract. 
Players anticipate this uncomfortable result at the starting phase of the constitutional 
choice as the ‘status quo’  that would result in absence of any constitutional framework. 
Then analytically, the constitutional choice game Gc has as its admissible outcomes the 
resumption of the ‘state of nature’  actual result, but also all the other possible outcomes 
in the ‘state of nature’ , and all the (linear) combinations among those outcomes. In other 
words, the technological frontier available to the parties has not changed, but now, 
following agreements, the institutional arrangement make it possible actually to obtain 
all the outcomes that were previously only virtually possible, and also all the 
combinations among them. This, therefore, is to assume that whilst in the ‘state of 
nature’  the only rationally achievable outcome is the sub-optimal equilibrium d*, in the 
situation of constitutional choice the parties may, on the basis of binding agreements, 
choose joint strategies that yield them all the outcomes that were only virtual in the 
‘state of nature’ , not rationally achievable, plus all their probabilistic combinations 
admitted by the fact that upon agreement they parties may decide to undertake two or 
more plans according to which events occur with an agreed joint probability.  
It is obviously needed to explain how binding agreements are made possible by moving 
from the state-of-nature game to the constitutional choice game. The explanation is that 
the former is a QRQFRRSHUDWLYH game, of ‘prisoner’ s dilemma’  type, with a single but 
sub-optimal solution, whilst the latter Gc is a FRRSHUDWLYH bargaining game, where, if an 
agreement is reached on a joint plan of action, it is certain that this plan will be 
implemented. Of course, there is no reason to believe that opting for a constitution 
rather than for concrete contracts is in itself sufficient to make agreements binding. 
Thus the explanation is simply that the constitutional choice game is a hypothetical 
(ethical) normative model in which the parties intend to ‘justify’  their choice of the 
constitution and believe that they can act on the basis of what they deem to be right. 
Given that they are counterfactually considering a hypothetical state of the world in 
which they are simply seeking a solution agreeable to all parties, one may also 
hypothesise that they presume themselves able to keep to the agreements reached if 
these have been negotiated rationally (this too is an acceptable hypothesis for an 
hypothetical justificatory model). Obviously in the LPSOHPHQWDWLRQFRQWH[W, as distinct 
from the MXVWLILFDWRU\ one, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the agreements 
reached in the hypothetical model of constitutional choice are also backed by effective 
motivations and incentives for individuals endowed with bounded rationality (which 
amounts to consider the compliance problem addressed in part II). 
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The distinctive feature of the constitutional choice game Gc is that the players (potential 
members of S) do not have to choose one particular joint strategy. Rather, they simply 
have to choose a subset of the set of admissible joint strategies (that is, a restriction over 
each player’ s set of strategies). Each subset of the strategies of the game Gc defines a 
limitation on the freedom of action that the players are endowed with in the ‘state of 
nature’ . Thus the choice of any whatever subset of possible strategies coincides with the 
choice of a ‘constitution’ . Moreover, each subset of the joint strategies (constitution) in 
its turn defines a cooperative sub-game, whose admissible outcomes cover only a 
portion of the outcomes admissible in Gc. This is a coalition game in which the players 
negotiate on how much they can obtain from cooperation according to their importance 
for the production of surplus (investments) and according to the constitutional rights 
that entitle them to take decisions that may influence the final value of cooperation with 
the others. These games correspond to the bargaining phase that, according to the 
economic theory of the firm, takes place at time t = 3 after investments have been 
undertaken and after unforeseen events unaccounted for by the constitutional contract 
have occurred, but in which cooperation is now protected by a constitution of rights. 
That the agreement concluded at time t = 3 belongs to the possible joint strategies of the 
sub-game chosen at t = 0, indicates how the constitution influences the outcomes of the 
second bargaining phase, restricting the number of strategies latterly available to the 
players. 
The individuals who are candidates for coalition S therefore take part in a sequential 
game. I may assume that they resolve the game by starting with the admissible 
outcomes of the post-constitutional phase and working backwards to the constitutional 
choice (backwards induction). Consequently, all the admissible outcomes and the 
solutions of the post-constitutional sub-games can be anticipated before the 
constitutional choice has been taken. This important simplification can be made in 
analogy to the theory of incomplete contracts (Grossman and Hart 1986, Hart and 
Moore 1990, Hart 1995, Tirole 1999), with the FDYHDW that in the real world of bounded 
rationality and effectively incomplete contracts, the parties will counterfactually 
reconstruct the H[ SRVW situation in the light of the constitutional contract they would 
have agreed upon in the hypothesis of being been able H[DQWH to foresee the H[SRVW 
situations. They therefore will apply the abstract principle of a fair contract according to 
the information available at that point in time, and will verify H[ SRVW whether it has 
been applied amid the contingencies which have arisen in the meantime (the 
‘implementation technology’  of the social contract model in real-world situations of 
bounded rationality also asks to be considered in part II on compliance and self-
regulation). 
With this caveat I therefore assume that, in the second stage, payoffs are assigned 
according to the solution for coalitional cooperative games known as the 6KDSOH\YDOXH 
and whereby each player obtains the expected payoff of the summation over all the 
possible of the sub-coalitions of S of the difference among the value when he is the last 
to enter and when he does not participate, multiplied by the probability that the sub-
coalitions will form. Given hypothetically each sub-game, the possible levels of 
investment, and the relative decisions permitted by rights, the players calculate the 
payoff assigned to them by the 6KDSOH\ YDOXH for the bargaining game that follows 
every given level of investments. They therefore choose the level of investment that 
enables them to obtain the highest payoff, on the hypothesis that the others too will 
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choose the level of investment at which they obtain the highest payoff. Thus for every 
post-constitutional sub-game there exists a univocal solution in terms of a precisely 
defined set of payoffs. 
Moving backwards to the initial phase of the constitutional choice, the question arises as 
to how this phase is handled. Each player knows that the choice of a subset of strategies 
(a constitution) gives rise to a particular solution for the associated sub-game. The space 
of the admissible outcomes of the constitutional choice may therefore be regarded as the 
set of the solutions of all the logically possible post-constitutional sub-games. 
Consequently, the Gc game too can be treated as a cooperative bargaining game in 
which the players must agree upon a particular outcome selected within an   admissible 
outcomes space (each point belonging to it corresponds to the solution of an alternative 
post-constitutional game). The constitutional choice must be made unanimously by all 
the potential members of S. In fact, the only rational agreement is the one that involves 
all the members of the large coalition S, for if this agreement is not reached they will 
fail in their attempt to establish a constitution, and they are doomed to play the ‘state of 
nature’  with its sub-optimal solution d*. Point d* is therefore the VWDWXVTXR of the Gc 
bargaining game. Consequently, the constitutional choice game is the typical 
cooperative bargaining game in which by unanimous agreement an efficient solution 
must be chosen from among all possible ones (set of Pareto outcomes), given the 
minimum condition that each acceptable agreement must give the parties at least what 
they would obtain in the VWDWXVTXR d*.  
 1DVKEDUJDLQLQJVROXWLRQ
The most accredited solution for bargaining problems of this kind is Nash bargaining 
solution: that is, the point on the efficient frontier of the admissible outcome space 
where the product among the players’  utilities is maximum net of the value to them of 
the VWDWXV TXR (Nash 1950). The solution follows from very general postulates 
demonstrated to be coincident with various other formulations of the rationality criteria 
for bargaining processes among Bayesian rational players (Harsanyi 1977, Binmore and 
Dasgupta 1987). Suffice it to say that if the space of the bargaining outcomes net of the 
VWDWXVTXR is symmetrical – that is, it includes for each player exactly all the payoffs that 
can be obtained from the other players – then the solution, which lies on the efficient 
outcomes frontier, must itself be symmetrical. It must, that is to say, distribute the utility 
gains with respect to the VWDWXVTXR (the surplus) LQHTXDOSDUWV among the bargaining 
parties. (Under certain conditions of invariance of the solution (i) to changes in the units 
of measure of the players’  utilities, (ii) to changes in the payoff space which eliminate 
irrelevant bargaining alternatives, and (iii) to symmetric permutations of players’  place 
with respect to a symmetrical payoff spaces, one concludes that the only solution 
compatible with the postulates is maximization of the 1DVKSURGXFW).  
Specifically, let me consider a case with two players, 1 and 2, and let us assume that the 
solution is a point in space R2 enclosed between the positive Cartesian axes U1 and U2, 
each of which measures the utility for a player of the outcomes of the cooperative game 
(see Figure 1 for this example). The space therefore represents the outcomes subject to  
bargaining in terms of their value in utility for the players (i.e. their payoffs). The 
standard analytical assumption is that the payoff space is convex and compact. The 
payoff space 3 therefore has an efficient frontier (in the upper-rightpositive region of 
the Cartesian plan) which represents the set of outcomes for which the players’  utilities 
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cannot be increased by an alternative agreement without reducing the utility of at least 
one other player. Below this frontier are agreements with respect to which gains are still 
possible for all; above it are outcomes unfeasible by any agreement or joint plan of 
action. All points in the space represent different possible values of the coalition among 
the two  players. In fact, only when all of them agree on the solution of the game can 
they leave the VWDWXVTXR G, which is represented by a point interior to the space, so that 
they may benefit form cooperation. The characteristic function of the coalition among 
all the players is therefore super-additive (it is better to agree than not to agree). 
Obviously, of interest are only those agreements for which there is an efficient 
allocation.  
But in what point among those on the frontier should the agreement fall? The Nash 
bargaining solution states that the players will agree on the joint strategy corresponding 
to the point over the frontier where the maximum product of the individual surpluses 
holds, i.e. 0D[Πi (Ui –di  (i=1,2 denotes the various participants in the bargaining), 
where 8     is the utility of the generic stakeholder L for the cooperative transaction that it 
undertakes with the firm, and G    is the cost of the specific investments made by L in 
order to participate in the joint action plan (that is, L always at least recoups the cost of 
its specific investment). The solution assumes that bargaining should provide each 
player with at least a net advantage, which is the difference between the share of the 
surplus received and the VWDWXV TXR value. As a consequence of additional rationality 
postulates, these net individual advantages can be identified as such that the SURGXFW of 
all of them is the maximum among those in the set of the possible outcomes of the 
cooperation. We may say that this is the collective choice function adopted by the 
members of the coalition, in light of their bargaining, to resolve the problem of their 
joint action. Notice that the ratio in which the shares of the surplus a1/a2 are distributed 
is proportional to the ratio between the marginal variations in the players’  utilities  
∂U1/∂U2 = − a1/a2. On the basis of Nash’ s postulates (1950) and those of the Zeuthen-
Harsanyi (see Harsanyi 1977), this solution expresses a bargaining equilibrium based on 
individual rationality of the players 
In the constitutional choice-bargaining game this solution has to be found out within a 
symmetrical outcome space generated, as said, from all the virtual outcomes of the 
‘state of nature’ , which represent all the ORJLFDOO\SRVVLEOH subsets of the set of strategies 
of the constitutional choice game - so that all the points in this space can also be 
interpreted as solutions for possible post-constitutional games. The Nash bargaining 
solution of the constitutional choice game therefore corresponds to a constitution on the 
basis of which a particular post-constitutional game begins once the admissible 
strategies have been selected and that will distribute to the players equal parts of the 
cooperative surplus calculated with respect to the constitutional choice outcome space 
(in the units of measurement of each player). This constitution obviously distributes the 
set of rights – among the right to ownership and governance within the firm (coalition 
S) – so that no party has an advantageous bargaining position when the post-
constitutional bargaining takes place.



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)LJ$V\PPHWULFDOWZRSOD\HUVFRRSHUDWLYHEDUJDLQLQJJDPHDQGLWV1DVKVROXWLRQ
5DWLRQDOFRQWUDFWLQJDQGGLVWULEXWLYHMXVWLFH
What interpretation can we give to the solution of the game GC in terms of the theory of 
distributive justice? 
a) 5DWLRQDO EDUJDLQLQJ DV LPSDUWLDOLW\. Rational bargaining comprises an elementary 
notion of impartiality of choice, given that not only do all the parties UDWLRQDOO\ accept 
the solution (which is therefore equally rational for them all) but the solution is 
anonymous: in fact, the Nash product remains unchanged under symmetrical 
permutation of place among the players. If the players change their place with respect to 
the set of strategies and the utilities associated with them, so that all the results that 
player A could previously obtain are now achievable by player B, and vice versa, then 
the solution will offer to player A exactly what it previously offered to player B (and 
vice versa). Hence the solution is anonymous and not attached to the name or personal 
identity of the player. In particular, if the payoff space is symmetrical, when the players 
change place with respect the strategies and outcomes, the solution will not change: it 
is, that is to say, exactly the same point in the space and the same cooperation pattern 
with permuted roles. This means that the only relevant features are the possibilities to 
contribute to the cooperation and their evaluation in terms of the participants’  utility. 
Let me assume the standpoint of an impartial observer who wants to find a collective 
solution which impartially reflects these features (and which is therefore acceptable to 
all). If I examine the bargaining problem from all the individual points of view, 
assuming the position of each participant in bargaining in turn, then I reach the 
conclusion that each of them accepts a solution which is identical with those accepted 
by all the others: the Nash bargaining solution. In other words, the Nash solution is the 
3
 
 
 DD
G
MaxΠ(Ui-di) 
where 
∂U1/∂U2 = - a1/a2 
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solution that the observer would come by reasoning from the point of view of DQ\
ZKDWHYHU participant.  
b) 0RUDOL]HGVWDWXVTXR. The impartiality of bargaining is obviously limited by the fact 
that it is affected by the VWDWXVTXR: that is, what the parties could have obtained in any 
case without cooperation will be conserved by the bargaining solution. This is a 
fundamental tenet of bargaining: why would the parties be interested in adhering to the 
agreement if they can obtain greater utility by staying out of it? The fact remains, 
however, that the surplus to be distributed in the payoff space is calculated on the basis 
of the VWDWXVTXR. Consequently, the better the VWDWXVTXR for a participant, the higher the 
payoff from bargaining. But if the status quo reflects ‘force’  or ‘fraud’ , these morally 
arbitrary features will be preserved by the bargaining solution. But consider the actual 
relevance of this classic objection (Rawls, Sen and Brian Barry, for example, have made 
it in various ways). The hypothetical social contract expresses a model for the choice of 
social institutions which are antecedent to any form of VRFLDO interaction that will be 
responsible in turn – for example via the social division of labour – for costs and 
benefits allocated amongst the participants in social interaction. It is therefore clear that 
no form of VRFLDO injustice can be represented in the VWDWXV TXR. What remain to be 
eliminated consequently is the arbitrariness due to the reciprocal use QDWXUDO force and 
fraud in the ‘state of nature’ .12  This difficulty is avoided by conventionally setting at 
zero-level the VWDWXV TXR for each party. All the effects of the destructive natural 
interaction among the parties must be neutralized if each of them is to agree to play the 
game of justifying by agreement the social institution. Zero-setting the VWDWXVTXR for all 
parties has another important property: no player at the outset of the constitutional 
bargaining game will have already borne the costs of the specific investments which H[
SRVW (at time t = 3) may induce him to acquiesce to unequal payoffs in order to recover 
at least those costs. By contrast, the VWDWXV TXR which is taken as given  when the 
constitutional solution is chosen ensures to each player at least the payoff that he had 
EHIRUH bearing the costs of the investment (which are instead reflected in the 
costs/benefits balance associated to each joint strategy). Given that in the constitutional 
choice I select a post-constitutional game with a specified final allocation of payoffs, the 
constitutional choice will never be subject to the lock-in effect that characterized the 
renegotiation of contracts in the theory of the firm. 
c) &RUUHVSRQGHQFH WR LQWXLWLYH SULQFLSOHV RI MXVWLFH. The sequential bargaining game 
solution can be given an ethical interpretation not only because of the neutrality of 
rational bargaining but also on the basis of the correspondence between each of the two 
concepts of solution I have employed and the intuitive principle of justice respectively 
appropriate to the bargaining phase in question. The solution to each post-constitutional 
game according to the 6KDSOH\YDOXH can be interpreted as an application of the principle 
of UHPXQHUDWLRQRQWKHEDVLVRIUHODWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQ. The Shapley value is in fact the 
linear combination (weighted with equal probability assigned to all the coalitions with 
the same number of members) of  the marginal contributions that an individual can 
make to all the coalitions. On the other hand, the Nash bargaining solution – provided 
the units of measure for the individual utilities are assumed to be interpersonally 
calibrated (which is not required for simple calculation of the Nash bargaining solution) 
                                                
12
 Gauthier (1986) discusses the idea of “ Lockean proviso”  as a moralisation for the bargaining status 
quo; my point differs slightly in that I want to introduce in the  players’  legitimate pre-bargaining claims 
also to coverage of costs of any specific investment  
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– can be interpreted as an equivalent solution to the distribution proportional to relative 
needs, that is, proportional to the relative intensity of variation in preference for the 
players at the point where the solution falls. This is the consequence  of what has been 
shown in section 4.2, where I said that the ratio in which the shares of the surplus are 
distributed is proportional to the ratio between the marginal variations in the players’  
utilities  ∂U1/∂U2 = − a1/a2. In fact, once the utility units are interpersonally calibrated, 
so that each unit expresses the same magnitude of preference for both the players, the 
ratio between their marginal variation measures the players’  relative needs (see Brock 
1979, Sacconi  1991, 2000).  
The twofold ethical characterisation of the bargaining solutions matches the different 
nature of the problems of collective choice modelled by the post-constitutional games 
on the one hand,
 
and the constitutional choice game GC on the other. Before they play a 
post-constitutional sub-game, the parties undertake their specific investments bearing in 
mind the guarantees offered by the constitution in regard to their possibilities of reaping 
the benefits of cooperation. Then, in the light of events occurred in the meantime, they 
calculate the effect of their participation in each coalition (the possible sub-coalitions of 
S), and finally contract with S the part due to them for concluding an agreement which 
will enable S to pursue its best joint strategy with which is associated a super-additive 
production function (or characteristic function). The solution of each sub-game 
distributes benefits to which the players have already contributed through their 
investment decisions and through their decision to join the coalition S. Therefore 
appropriate at this point is the distribution criterion based on UHODWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQ or, 
put it otherwise, UHODWLYHPHULWV.  Instead, in the case of the constitutional bargaining 
game GC, none of the parties subscribing the agreement has yet contributed anything, so 
that the merit or relative contribution criterion does not seem to be a valid criterion of 
distributive justice here. Chosen in GC is the constitution on the basis of which the 
investment decisions will be taken. Rather, what the various players will be willing to 
contribute depends on the choice of the constitution. It is therefore obvious that account 
must be taken of the need to provide efficient incentives for their contribution. Also 
these rights-for-incentive, however, must be accepted in an agreement among 
participants in the constitutional bargaining who consider only what is relevant from 
their current point of view. In the absence of any relevance of their merits, in this case 
only QHHGV can be accounted for. Hence an appropriate criterion for solution will refer to 
the relative needs of the parties for what will subsequently enable them to contribute to 
the cooperative production. 
To conclude, the solution to the game of constitutional choice consists of the following 
UXOHIRUFRQVWLWXWLRQDOFKRLFH
(i) VHOHFW a socially Pareto HIILFLHQW constitution calculated on the basis of the 
particular VWDWXVTXR (0,...,0) which 
(ii) GLVWULEXWHV the surplus generated by the cooperation among the members of S 
in SURSRUWLRQ to their UHODWLYHQHHGV, if the distribution is seen in the context 
of the constitutional choice (with respect to the payoffs space P of the GC 
constitutional choice), 
(iii) but also SURSRUWLRQDOO\ to the UHODWLYHFRQWULEXWLRQV, if seen in the context of 
the post-constitutional choice which occurs in the coalition sub-game which 
begins after the constitution has been chosen 
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([FOXVLYHSURSHUW\ULJKWVDQGWKHGXW\WRFRPSHQVDWHWKHQRQFRQWUROOLQJSDUWLHV
We have thus far considered the more abstract case  in which HYHU\ORJLFDOO\ possible 
constitution is subject to constitutional choice. In other words, every ORJLFDOO\SRVVLEOH 
subset of admissible outcomes in GC corresponds to a constitution than can be chosen. 
In this case, every point in the payoff space of the constitutional choice game 
corresponds to a solution of an admissible constitution (subset of strategies). This would 
be a world in which it is possible to finely partition decision rights in whatever 
proportion among the parties. In other words, institutions that greatly restrict freedom 
are just as possible as extremely liberal ones, and likewise institutions which impose 
every intermediate restrictions or which grant rights to a greater or lesser extent to one 
or other participant. Given that the choice can be made from such a wide range of 
options, the achievable institutions would be perfectly efficient and fair, and they would 
not be subject to the second-best results typical of the theory of the firm. 
   Instead, I hypothesise more realistically – as suggested by the modern theory of 
property rights – that only a certain number of restrictions on the set of the strategies of 
the base Gc game are institutionally feasible. I shall regard as institutionally feasible a 
constitution under which a relationship of authority can be established and which 
consequently can ensure that any contracts made between the parties can be enforced 
and the completion H[SRVW of any gap of H[DQWH contracts. In particular let us allow that 
only exclusive allocations of the property rights over the whole of the physical assets of 
the firm are institutionally feasible. Connected to this is the possibility of assigning all 
the authority to one party or another, but no intermediate gradations of it (as in the 
egalitarian solution found previously). Let us therefore assume that the ownership 
arrangements allowed by the feasible constitutions are such as to bias post-
constitutional bargaining heavily in favour of one or other party. Corresponding to these 
constitutions are particular post-constitutional games whose admissible outcomes all 
together cover only a portion of the outcome space obtained in Gc from the original 
game of the ‘state of nature’ . The salient aspect of this situation is that the Nash 
bargaining solution with respect to the all-inclusive payoff space of the GC game may 
now not coincide with the solution of any of the institutionally feasible sub-games, 
simply because the choice must fall within the set of LQVWLWXWLRQDOO\ IHDVLEOH solutions, 
putting aside others as ‘Utopian’  (even though they are more efficient and fairer).   
   How should we deal with the constitutional choice in this imperfect world? The 
criteria proposed by economic theory are based on the importance of investments and 
on indispensability. If one party when endowed with ownership is able to ensure a 
higher surplus, he may be able to purchase the property right from the other. If we take 
as the VWDWXVTXR an arrangement of rights under which one party has ownership, it can 
be verified that the alternative arrangement of property rights is more efficient if it is 
possible to find a utility side payment which enables the second party to induce the first 
to cede to him the property right. That is, ownership is allocated to the party who has 
more important contributions to make to production, or who is indispensable for the 
investments of the others to be productive. This implies choosing the feasible post-
constitutional sub-game whose solution is closest to the Pareto frontier of the game.    
    However, the rational consent of the other agents also has to be accounted for in the 
context of the constitutional bargaining model. They may be ready to accept that the 
player who makes the most valuable investment or who is most indispensable for 
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realising the value of these investments should be given property rights. Nevertheless, 
making the constitutional choice requires the consent of all the players whose 
membership in the coalition ensures the super-additivity of the value of S (whether they 
make specific investments, are indispensable agents with respect to some assets, or 
ordinary members of S who add some value to the coalition). This requirement entails 
that the proceeds of the actions will reward all parties fairly.  
   Fortunately, I’ m still able to calculate the IDLU distribution that recognizes the 
legitimate claims of the parties. The initial position is ‘without rights’ , so that the 
appropriate VWDWXV TXR of an N person game is therefore (0,...,0). Contribution-based 
claims are not relevant here because in GC the contributions have not yet been made. 
Investments come into play only before the sub-games are played. Distribution 
according to the criterion of relative need can now be calculated by taking as the set of 
permissible RXWFRPHV the convex hull of all the linear combination of points in the 
payoff spaces defined by the institutionally feasible games and the VWDWXVTXR (0,...,0). 
Within this set of points, the Nash bargaining solution permits isolation of a fair SD\RII 
distribution. This solution is clearly different from the constitutional contract in the 
Utopian context, since in general the combination of the two or more payoff spaces 
relative to institutionally feasible games (constitutions) Gi is only a subset of the payoff 
space of the constitutional choice game GC and does not necessarily includes all the 
north-east frontier of the GC payoff space (see fig. 2 for an example with two players: 
P3 is the convex combination of the payoff space P1 and P2 associated to the feasible 
constitutions; within it the Nash bargaining solution is Pareto inferior to the same 
solution relative to the entire payoff space P relative to the basic GC game) 
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The problem, however, is that  not even one of the solutions of feasible constitutional 
sub-games corresponds to this distribution (with two post-constitutional games, the fair 
solution is a linear combination of their two solutions, that is, a ‘mid-way’  between 
max Πi(ui−di*) in 
P3 does not 
belong to P1 and 
P2,  
FH >AB 
therefore 
max Πi(ui−d) in P1 
        > 
max Πi(ui−d) in P2 
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them not belonging to any space of the two feasible game). The solution that can be 
suggested is  based on a VLGHXWLOLW\SD\PHQW.
 
In order to get from the VWDWXVTXR (0,...,0) 
to the most efficient solution of a particular sub-game, the player who would obtain a 
position of advantage must underwrite a side utility payment. On conclusion of this 
payment, the distributions of SD\RIIV will conform to the criterion of distribution 
proportional to relative need, despite the fact that with this particular arrangement of 
property rights he is able to obtain a larger portion of the surplus than the other parties. 
Consequently, the remuneration of those that do not have ownership takes the form of 
compensation for ceding their quotas of freedom By way of example (see again fig.2), 
consider the case of two players. If A is more efficient (because his investment is more 
important), this means that there is one feasible constitution C1,
 
which assigns 
ownership to A, which defines a sub-game G1 with a payoff space P1 whose solution is 
more efficient than that of the alternative constitution C2
 
which assigns the property to 
B and which defines a sub-game G2 with payoff space P2. Thus, for reasons of incentive, 
ownership must be given to A. However, in order to obtain ownership A must still take 
account of B’ s claims and compensate him. The constitutional contract stipulates that 
the fair distribution must correspond to the point in which the two members of the 
cooperative coalition will be remunerated in proportion to their relative needs. This 
solution is calculated within the payoff space P3 generated as the convex hull of the 
linear combinations of the outcomes associated with the actually feasible constitutions. 
This requires utility side payments by which the party who makes the most efficient use 
of ownership compensates those are less efficient until the cooperative surplus is 
distributed according to the criterion of relative need. The idea of compensation 
obviously requires the firm’ s institutional structure to incorporate a notion of ‘social 
responsibility’ , by which is meant WKH REOLJDWLRQ RI WKH SDUW\ DOORFDWHG RZQHUVKLS WR
FRPSHQVDWH WKH RWKHU SDUWLHV WR WKH VRFLDO FRQWUDFW IRU WKH DGYDQWDJH WKDW KH KDV
DFTXLUHGE\EHLQJJUDQWHGDXWKRULW\RYHUWKHILUP. The social responsibility of the party 
with authority over the firm is measured by its ability to run the firm consistently with 
the principle of having all parties a share in the firm’ s surplus, as established by the 
Nash solution of the constitutional choice (in its realistic version). This applies even if, 
under the outcome resulting immediately from the constitutional sub-game selected, the 
party with authority has the legal means to appropriate an extra-rent, i.e. a substantially 
larger part of the surplus. This extra-rent must be reimbursed in accordance with the 
principle of constitutional choice based on relative needs. 
The constitutional contract therefore stipulates the following institutional structure of 
the firm in the LPSHUIHFW world of institutionally feasible constitutions: 
i. assuming that the N-S members remain indifferent and therefore do not undergo 
negative external effects from the firm, 
ii. the firm constituted by the coalition S will be headed by the party under whose 
governance the Shapley-value solution distributes to the various stakeholders an 
aggregate value that is greater than the alternatives; 
iii. this governing party will have the right to take residual decisions or delegate them to 
the management and take the residual on the proviso that 
iv. the cooperative surplus made possible by the constitutional arrangement selected is 
measured from a VWDWXV TXR including ‘coverage’  of the costs borne by each 
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stakeholder in making its specific investment (that is, it is free from the ‘lock-in 
effect), 
v. each member of the coalition S obtains a share of the surplus that reflects its relative 
contribution to the value of the coalition S in the institutional form selected, 
vi. to which must be added (or subtracted) a quota by virtue of which the final 
distribution is equal to the distribution proportional to relative needs defined in the 
constitutional phase with respect to the set of institutionally feasible outcomes. 
This concludes my deduction of the institutional framework for corporate governance of 
the socially responsible firm from a normative model of rational bargaining.  
 $QREMHFWLYHIXQFWLRQIRUWKHILUP 
The main objection brought against CSR is that the multi-stakeholder approach to the 
firm’ s governance leaves management without a clearly-stated and uniquely defined 
‘bottom line’ , to be used as the benchmark against which to evaluate its success or 
failure (Jensen 2001). The consequence, the argument runs, is that the management 
exploits this situation to pursue its personal interests. It comes up with every possible 
device to conceal its essentially self-dealing behaviour behind the interests of some or 
other stakeholder. Whereas, the critics of CSR maintain, it is easy to check  the 
managerial strategy (among the alternatives available at any particular time) against the 
criterion of increasing as much as possible the firm’ s profits, this is not the case of 
‘stakeholder value’ , since this consists of numerous dimensions to maximize 
simultaneously (the interests of the various stakeholders). Consequently, stakeholder 
value contains an intrinsic contradiction – the pursuit of conflicting, or at any rate 
divergent, goals at the same time – so that the choice of which strategy to adopt is 
ultimately left to the mere managerial discretion.13 In sum, this objection amounts to say 
that the multi-stakeholder approach can not  provide the firm a prescriptive guidance as 
clear as profit maximisation.  
It should be clear, however, that this objection does not apply to the model of the social 
contract of the firm proposed here – which by no means ignores the existence of a 
distributive conflict, and instead resolves it by identifying a bargaining equilibrium that 
permits mutual cooperation among the members of the team.  Once the firm is 
understood as a team of participants with specific investments at stake, the metaphor of 
a ‘bargaining cooperative game’  among multiple stakeholders can be used. Stakeholders 
must agree on a shared action plan (a joint strategy) which allocates tasks among the 
members of the team so that the contribution of each of them is efficient (because it 
produces the maximum surplus net of each stakeholder’ s costs). The ‘bargaining 
cooperative game’  played by the stakeholders is typically one of mixed interests. 
Although it is in their common interest to cooperate, because this enables them to 
produce a surplus that would otherwise be impossible, conflict nevertheless persists 
among the stakeholders over the distribution of the value created. ‘Governance’  and 
strategic management consequently consist in the solution of the problems of 
identifying the joint strategy that the stakeholders (as the players in the cooperative 
game) may utilize to coordinate themselves – so that strategic management can reduce 
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 This danger is also stressed by Tirole (2001), who however recognizes the relevance of  the stakeholder 
approach to corporate governance. 
 28 
bargaining costs (time, conflict, etc.) and the costs of gathering information on the 
alternatives available and on the intentions of each players about cooperation. 
As we have seen in the foregoing section,  counterpart to the philosophical contractarian  
model is a mathematical model of rational bargaining. If the bargaining outcome space 
is well defined and one accepts the Nash’ s, or Harsanyi-Zeuthen’ s postulates of 
bargaining theory, the solution is defined uniquely, so that the set of admissible 
solutions reduces to one single alternative. Calculable within the outcome space is 
indeed the Nash bargaining function - the product of the utilities of the various 
stakeholders with specific investments net of costs for that investments -  that is an 
aggregative function of their utilities. Where the product (the aggregation) is maximum, 
there is a bargaining equilibrium (i.e. a rational agreement among the participants in the 
social contract) corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution (Nash 1950; Harsanyi 
1977). In any event, various theories of bargaining yield solutions which quite closely 
resemble each other – see Gauthier (1986), Kalai and Smordinski (1975) and  
Rubinstein (1987) - as they are slight changes of the basic Nash’ s solution; and for the 
purposes of this study, identifying a set of ‘close’  solutions compatible with the idea of 
rational bargaining seems good enough.  
It is remarkable that the bargaining solution is exactly as computable as the firm’ s  
profit function in microeconomic theory. Hence I can simply substitute maximization of 
the function which assigns the solution to the bargaining game for profit maximization, 
and assume this as the firm’ s computable objective-function. This solution is 
simultaneously an answer to both the problem of cooperation and distributive conflict 
among the stakeholders. Thus the query for a simultaneous satisfaction of multiple 
possibly conflicting objectives is answered by the maximisation of a unique solution 
function defined over the outcome space.  
Notice that finding out the bargaining equilibrium does not need operational 
interpersonal comparisons of utility (which operationally are very problematic) in order 
to be calculated (interpersonal comparisons can be confined to the interpretive level14) 
and thus it is not informatively over-demanding concerning what the manager needs to 
know about the intensity of stakeholders’  preferences. It obeys, in fact, simple axioms 
of individual rationality in bargaining – like the decision to grant a concession 
according to the expected personal utility given the probability that the counterparty 
will accept or refuse it, or that a player will not make a concession that he or she would 
not expect the counterparty will make in  a similar situation – and conditions of 
mutually expected rationality, like expecting that the willingness of acceptance by the 
counterparty depends on a symmetric probabilistic assessment of the first party 
behaviour, and not to expect the counterparty to accept something that oneself would 
not accept, and so on (see Harsanyi 1977). These postulates includes the invariance of 
the solution with respect to the choice of  the units of measure if individual utilities. Of 
course, if these postulates are taken literally, they can be criticised as unrealistic; and it 
is likely that in the real world agents are unable to maximize or to estimate probabilities 
coherently, or to make accurate forecasts about the rational behaviour of others. But 
what matters for my purposes so far is that these postulates are a good approximation of 
rational behaviour in a hypothetical (ideal) bargaining situation among stakeholders and 
at the same time they provide a prescriptive guidance to strategic management  – one no 
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 See Brock (1979), and Sacconi (1991). 
 29 
less prescriptive and clear than profit maximization advocated by critics of CSR like 
Michael Jensen. Of course the point of bounded rationality maintains its force, but I will 
address it in the second part of this essay, when implementation will come under 
scrutiny.  
 7KH VRFLDO FRQWUDFW DV SRWHQWLDO H[SODQDWLRQ RI WKH ILUP¶V
 HPHUJHQFH
Thus far, the social contract has been presented as a normative theory by which to 
identify the terms of an agreement that would be acceptable from both a rational 
bargaining perspective and an impartial standpoint – that is, from the point of view of 
any whatever stakeholder. However, social contract theory can also furnish a 
reconstruction – understood as a ‘potential explanation’  – of how bargaining may give  
rise to a firm with ERWK fiduciary duties towards the owners DQG social responsibility 
(i.e. further fiduciary duties) towards all the stakeholders. 
Consider the ‘state of nature’  prior to the creation of the firm. Bilateral transactions 
among stakeholders regulated by incomplete contracts are subject to reciprocal 
opportunistic behaviour, with the consequence that prohibitive bargaining costs render 
them inefficient. At the same time, the parties to those transactions are entirely 
unconcerned about the negative external effects of their transactions on other agents, 
who although they do not participate, are nevertheless affected. This is a Hobbesian 
scenario in which the life of economic transactions among agents is  “ solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish, and short” .15 The stakeholders thus address the problem of creating an 
association whereby all their transactions can be undertaken in accordance with agreed-
to rules and are therefore not subject to contract-costs, while at the same time the 
negative effects on those who do not participate in the benefits from the transactions are 
reduced to the minimum. The ‘First Social Contract’  of the firm (SDFWXP XQLRQLV) is 
nothing other than the agreement which the stakeholders reach DPRQJWKHPVHOYHV to set 
up this association. They negotiate on the association’ s constitution, which consists in a 
common plan of action (joint strategy) to which each of them contributes either by 
carrying out a positive effort or by simply refraining from applying his/her veto. This 
ILUVWVRFLDOFRQWUDFWRIWKHILUP stipulates as follows: 
a. rejection of shared plans of action which generate negative externalities for those not 
participating in the cooperative venture or, if these negative externalities are 
essential for the production of the cooperative surplus, a compensation of third 
parties so that they are rendered neutral; 
b. production of the maximum surplus possible (difference between the value of the 
product for its consumers, who belong to the association, and the costs sustained by 
each stakeholder to produce it); 
c. a distribution of the surplus which is ‘fair’ , or rationally acceptable to each 
stakeholder in a bargaining process free from force or fraud and based on an 
equitable VWDWXVTXR, that is, considering the surplus net of the specific investments. 
However, if an attempt is made to reach this form of an ideal association (the ‘just 
firm’ ) which eliminates all the participants’  contract-costs, they arrive in practice to an 
organisational form which is found to be inefficient from the point of view of its 
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governance costs. The stakeholders discover, for example, that the general assembly of 
all members is unable to take coherent decisions in a reasonable amount of time. In the 
absence of a monitoring system, once the members of the association have established 
fair shares of the surplus to be distributed among them, they have an incentive to act 
opportunistically and not to play their part. Coordination problems arise on how the 
joint strategy can be implemented under  changing circumstances, which may alter 
beliefs and  reciprocal expectations asymmetrically. The stakeholders consequently 
draw up a VHFRQG VRFLDO FRQWUDFW of the firm (SDFWXP VXEMHFWLRQV)16 by which they 
constitute, in the proper sense of the term, a governance structure for the association. It 
is only now that the association becomes a hierarchical structure. 
The second social contract provides that authority should be delegated to the 
stakeholder most efficient in performing governance functions (the taking of residual 
decisions, devising coordination solutions as circumstances change, monitoring, the 
enactment of sanctions, excluding potential free riders, etc.). For this reason, it can also 
be seen as a contract EHWZHHQWKHVWDNHKROGHUVDQG those who is given control over the 
firm (social contract ZLWK WKH ILUP). After comparative examination of the governance 
costs of each stakeholder, the one with the lowest costs is selected and assigned 
ownership, and is therefore the one to which the right of governing the association is 
delegated (Hansmann 1996). This class, which is remunerated with the UHVLGXDO is 
authorised to delegate some discretionary decisions in regard to running the firm to 
professional director and managers, and to appoint those who are in the authority 
position of running the firm. 3ULPDIDFLH, their authority will be effectively constituted – 
that is, the delegation will remain valid – as long as they comply with what I call 
• 1DUURZILGXFLDU\SURYLVR: the owners are remunerated with the maximum residual 
revenue possible (in forms compatible with the diverse nature of the controlling 
stakeholder: profits, returns, discounts, improved conditions of service, improved 
conditions of employment, and so on) in the light of conditions obtaining in the 
firm’ s specific market. 
However, it is evident that this proviso entails that the positions of the other 
stakeholders change (from the “ just firm”  to MXVWDILUP). Formerly co-equal members of 
the association, they are now subject in various ways to the discretionary decisions 
taken by the stakeholder entitled with authority, and by the administrators that it has 
appointed. Unlike in the standard economic theory of the firm, in the social contract  
theory the risk of the abuse of authority can squarely be faced. The VHFRQG VRFLDO
FRQWUDFW is therefore conceived in a manner such that this cost of hierarchy is forestalled 
as well. Hence, under the second social contract, the stakeholders agree to submit to 
authority, thereby rendering it effective, if the contract contains the proviso that 
stipulates that the firm’ s new governance structure must comply with ILGXFLDU\GXWLHV 
towards all the stakeholders (owners and non-owners).   
• ([WHQGHGILGXFLDU\SURYLVR 
(i) 7RZDUGVWKHQRQRZQHUV 
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− The firm must abstain from activities which impose negative external effects on 
stakeholders not party to transactions, or compensate them so that they remain 
neutral; 
− The firm must remunerate the stakeholders participating in the firm’ s transactions 
with pay-offs (monetary or of other kinds, for example in terms of the quantity, 
quality and prices of goods, services, working conditions, etc.) which, taken for 
granted a fair status quo, must contain a part tied to the firm’ s economic 
performance such to approximate fair/efficient shares of the surplus (assuming that 
this is positive) as envisaged by the first social contract.17 
(ii)  7RZDUGV WKH RZQHUV: The firm must remunerate the owners with the maximum 
residual compatible with fair remuneration – as defined by the first social contract – of 
the efficient contributions made by all the other stakeholders. 
The telescopic nature of the narrow and extended provisos in the second social contract 
reflects the sequential structure of the constitutional model developed in sec. 4. Over 
there the implementation of an ownership structure in the post constitutional phase  – 
able to remunerate merits and incentive investments -  was compatible with the choice 
made from the first phase constitutional viewpoint, in which the social contract over 
institutions is consistent with the criterion of stakeholders’  relative needs. Here, on the 
other hand, the second social contract solves the problem of minimizing governance 
costs and allocating rent under the constraint of satisfying the first social contact, which 
concerns the agreement over a constitution of the productive association, or team, and is 
identified by a cooperative bargaining solution. It consequently must be coherent also 
with the relative needs  distribution principle. 
What does this hypothetical explanation yield? It yields a definition of the company 
goal – that is, the interest that the manager acting in the name of the company must 
serve – which is consistent with the contractarian model put forward in sec. 4. 
According to this reconstruction, in fact, the manager (appointed through the second 
social contract) has a special fiduciary duty towards the owners (or the ‘residual 
claimant’ ) that has delegated authority to him/her (YLD narrow fiduciary proviso). This 
duty applies, however, only under the constraint that the JHQHUDO fiduciary duties are 
fulfilled towards DOO the stakeholders – which is defined YLD the extended fiduciary 
SURYLVR. I may thus construct the corporate interest by means of a hierarchical decision-
making procedure which moves from the most general conditions to the most specific 
ones: 
• )LUVW VWHS: minimize the negative externalities affecting stakeholders in the broad 
sense (perhaps by paying suitable compensation); 
• 6HFRQGVWHS: identify the agreements compatible with the maximization of the joint 
surplus and its simultaneous fair distribution, as established by the impartial 
cooperative agreement among the stakeholders in the strict sense; 
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 Note that meant here is remuneration in utility and not necessarily in money. Put in economic parlance, 
this remuneration consists of the consumer  rent, the producer rent, the worker rent and so on, accruing to 
each of them from the firm’ s transactions. This means that some  stakeholders may not want to receive 
monetary benefits from the firm, but rather improvements in working conditions or in purchasingpower, 
in the quality of goods and services, of contractual conditions, etc., to which the shares of the surplus are 
in any case devoted..  
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• 7KLUG VWHS: if more than one option is available in the above defined feasible se, 
choose the one that maximizes the UHVLGXDO allocated to the owner (for example, the 
shareholder). 
Hence, the narrow corporate  interest (the one usually advocated by supporters of the 
“ shareholder value”  view) results from a series of steps which select the admissible 
ways in which this interest can be satisfied – that is, those that are consistent with the 
various constraints imposed by the first social contract on the owner’ s behaviour. It 
should be emphasized  that this concept cannot be reduced to that of value maximization 
for the ‘residual claimant’  (the owners) once constraints imposed by positive contractual 
obligations have been fulfilled. This is because I recognize all contracts are incomplete, 
and they are always susceptible to opportunism (even by those who run the firm), so 
that it is the entire hierarchical decision procedure which provides the basis for 
satisfying the corporate interest – i.e. the social contract identifies the goals or the 
internal (not merely external) moral constraints that channels managerial discretion.  
 &RQFOXVLRQ
Normative stakeholder theories have failed in various ways to specify a criterion for 
striking a balance among a firm’ s stakeholders. This is due to the fact that they have not 
adequately addressed the problem from the point of view of designing the institutional 
governance structure of the firm: that is, the complex set of rights which establishes the 
legitimate claims (of various kinds) of both the stakeholders with ownership and control 
and the other stakeholders that in various ways participate in the firm or exchange with 
it. To do so, they should have neither restricted themselves to the managerial (i.e. 
micro) level, however essential it may be, nor enlarged too much their scope to include 
the macro-social contract as a whole. Instead they should have examined the ethical 
design of the firm as a particular social institution (i.e. at the meso level).18 This design 
must necessarily draw upon the economic and legal models of the firm. The theory of 
the constitutional contract of the firm offers solutions to these problems. It is better than 
the alternatives - for example Donaldson and Dunfee (1955)  - because it explains how a 
firm may be created by agreement among the stakeholders, simultaneously considering 
efficiency and fairness and drawing on a formal model of rational bargaining which 
enables univocal solutions to be drawn. Accordingly, the firm is an institution that may 
come into being in relative isolation from other institutions, provided that the social 
contract protects stakeholders in the broad sense against external effects. It thus makes it 
possible to propose an institutional arrangement which, without omitting the efficiency 
requirements typical of the economic and legal analysis of contracts and property rights, 
entails a substantial reform of the governance structure of the firm in respect to 
conventional models.
From an HFRQRPLF point of view, the institutional arrangement selected by the 
constitutional contract of the firm serves the purpose of achieving greater VRFLDO
HIILFLHQF\. The investment decisions of each agent, in fact, will be made with a view to 
compensation and redress, to which incentives will adjust as a consequence. That is, the 
owner will not over-invest in order to appropriate extra-rent, while the parties under his 
authority will not under-invest due to the risk of being expropriated. From the legal 
point of view, it furnishes a definition of the PXOWLSOH ILGXFLDU\GXWLHV of the board of 
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directors (and D IRUWLRUL of the owners) of the firm towards the stakeholders, so that 
conflicting claims are not only explicitly considered but also balanced against each 
other in accordance with a hypothetical principle of agreement that the parties would 
have accepted H[DQWH when the firm was founded if all the information available now 
had been considered at that time. From the HWKLFDO point of view, because the solution 
proposed results from a process of hypothetical bargaining, it is QHXWUDO. It does not 
reflect any arbitrariness in the bargaining VWDWXVTXR, and it also fulfils two principles of 
distributive justice. For reasons of realism, it is chosen from among the LQVWLWXWLRQDOO\
IHDVLEOH arrangements. That is to say, this is not a Utopian theory, but rather a theory 
constrained by the need to give a viable design to the economic institutions (and which 
for example envisages exclusive property rights in the form that we have seen). The 
structure of rights and duties is deduced and justified endogenously, from the simple 
idea of a rational agreement, not imposed on the basis of a mere intuition of what 
society as a whole would require of the firm. It does not suffer from the normative 
indeterminacy of other normative stakeholder theories. 
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